The Battle of Midway

The Battle of Midway took place from 4 to 6 June 1942, six months after Pearl Harbour and only a month after the American defeat at the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Imperial Japanese Navy aimed to lure the remaining U.S. Pacific carriers into a trap near Midway Atoll, seize the atoll as a forward base, and crush American naval power in the Pacific. Success promised Japan command of the central Pacific and time to consolidate its far-flung conquests. The United States, rebuilding rapidly and guided by a growing intelligence edge, prepared to contest the operation with a thinner order of battle but decisive positioning.

Intelligence and Codebreaking

The U.S. Navy’s cryptologic unit at Station HYPO in Pearl Harbour had been working for months to penetrate the Japanese naval code JN-25. By late May, the team led by Commander Joseph Rochefort identified “AF” as the Japanese target and assessed the timing as early June. To confirm that AF meant Midway, HYPO arranged for Midway to send an unencrypted radio message stating that its freshwater plant had broken down. Shortly after, Japanese intercepts reported that AF was short of water, verifying the identification. This advance knowledge allowed Admiral Chester Nimitz to concentrate his limited carrier forces northeast of Midway and set an ambush.

Orders of Battle

Japan sailed with the First Air Fleet under Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the same striking arm that had hit Pearl Harbour. The core of the fleet consisted of four fleet carriers: Akagi and Kaga from Carrier Division 1, and Soryu and Hiryu from Carrier Division 2. Fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers escorted them. A separate invasion group and a powerful distant covering force under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, including battleships and additional cruisers, trailed to the west. Submarines were stationed on a picket line to detect approaching American ships, but deployment errors left gaps that the U.S. carriers slipped through.

The American carrier force consisted of Task Force 16, comprising Enterprise and Hornet, under Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance, and Task Force 17, with Yorktown, under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Yorktown had been damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea but was rushed through a remarkable three-day repair effort at Pearl Harbour. Midway itself was fortified with Marine aircraft, including dive bombers and torpedo planes, along with Army bombers and Navy patrol aircraft. The Americans would rely on a combination of land-based strikes and carrier aviation.

Midway Atoll and the Plan

Midway consists of Eastern and Sand islands, surrounded by reef and lagoon. It was valuable as an early warning and patrol base astride trans-Pacific routes. Nimitz’s plan depended on letting Nagumo strike Midway first, revealing his carriers, while the U.S. flattops remained unseen to the northeast. Once Japanese carriers were located by search aircraft, Spruance and Fletcher would launch concentrated strikes to disable flight decks and set fires that could not be easily controlled on aviation gas-laden ships.

The Opening Strikes, 4 June

At dawn on 4 June, Nagumo launched a first wave of more than 100 aircraft to attack Midway’s airfields and installations. The strike caused damage but failed to knock the base out. Midway’s defenders scrambled everything they had. Marine F2A Buffalo and F4F Wildcat fighters engaged the incoming raid and suffered heavy losses. Meanwhile, Midway’s bombers, including Navy TBF Avengers, Marine SBD Dauntlesses, and Army B-26s and B-17s, went on the offensive. Their piecemeal attacks were brave but largely ineffective, often made at low altitude against alert combat air patrol fighters and concentrated antiaircraft fire. Several torpedo aircraft were shot down. A B-26 damaged by flak nearly clipped Akagi’s island in a low pass that underscored both the determination of the attackers and the peril of uncoordinated assaults.

Nagumo’s Dilemma

Nagumo faced a critical choice after the first strike. Midway was still operational, suggesting a second strike might be needed. At the same time, reports of American ships in the area began to trickle in from search planes, some of which were late and incomplete. Nagumo had initially held half his aircraft in reserve, armed with anti-ship weapons. Following doctrine to achieve local objectives first, he ordered the reserve to be rearmed for a second strike on Midway. Then, upon receiving contact reports of enemy surface forces, he reversed the order to rearm for anti-ship attacks. On a carrier deck, changing bomb loads takes time and exposes fuel lines, ordnance, and aircraft simultaneously. This created a vulnerable moment. Japanese combat air patrols were busy, and fuel management was becoming complex. Deck parks and hangars were crowded, and a single hit could be catastrophic.

American Torpedo Squadrons Press In

While Nagumo’s crews worked frantically, American carrier aircraft were already inbound. Due to navigation errors and differing speeds, the attacks arrived in waves rather than a single coordinated punch. Torpedo Squadron 8 from Hornet, flying obsolete TBD Devastators under Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, attacked first without fighter escort. All fifteen were shot down with no hits. Only one man, Ensign George Gay, survived to watch the battle from the water. Torpedo Squadron 6 from Enterprise and Torpedo Squadron 3 from Yorktown followed and met similar fates, suffering grievous losses under Zeros and antiaircraft fire.

These torpedo attacks are sometimes described as failures, yet they dragged the Japanese combat air patrol low and out of position. They also kept the carriers manoeuvring violently, complicating deck operations and leaving little margin for error as crews tried to spot and arm aircraft. Minutes matter in a carrier battle, and these minutes were bought at a terrible cost.

The Dive Bombers Arrive

Around 10:20 a.m., the situation turned with startling speed. Enterprise dive bombers from Scouting Squadron 6 and Bombing Squadron 6, led in the final approach by Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky, arrived over Nagumo’s force after a difficult search. McClusky’s decision to follow a lone Japanese destroyer racing at high speed toward the north led him directly to the carriers. Almost simultaneously, Yorktown’s Bombing Squadron 3 arrived from a different bearing. With the combat air patrol pulled down by the torpedo attacks and with Japanese decks cluttered, the American dive bombers had a nearly ideal target set.

In the space of about five minutes, Soryu, Kaga, and Akagi were struck by multiple 500-pound bombs. Hits on flight decks ignited fueled and armed aircraft. Fires spread rapidly through hangars. Damage control struggled against burning aviation fuel, ruptured lines, and detonating ordnance. Kaga and Soryu were soon fatally ablaze. Akagi, Nagumo’s flagship, was mortally wounded by a bomb that penetrated near the aft elevator and set off secondary explosions. The Japanese striking power was suddenly halved, and its command centre was crippled.

Hiryu’s Counterstrikes

Hiryu, operating slightly apart, avoided the initial hammer blow. Her air group launched two counterstrikes, demonstrating skill and resilience. The first found Yorktown and scored bomb hits that knocked out her boilers and temporarily halted flight operations. Rapid damage control restored power and flight deck function more quickly than the attackers expected. The second wave, guided by earlier sightings that still assumed Yorktown was out of action, again found the same ship. Torpedoes struck, and this time the damage was severe, leaving Yorktown dead in the water and listing. The carrier would remain afloat for many hours due to the determined efforts of her crew and escorting ships.

With Yorktown disabled, American searchers located Hiryu. Late in the afternoon, Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers launched their attacks. Hiryu took fatal hits that set her ablaze. By nightfall, all four Japanese carriers had been knocked out of the fight. Scuttling and fires would finish them off in the hours that followed.

5 June to 6: Aftermath at Sea

The following days saw pursuit and rearguard actions. Japanese heavy cruisers Mogami and Mikuma collided during evasive manoeuvres while trying to avoid submarine attack, and subsequent air strikes sank Mikuma. Their escorts scuttled Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu after crews abandoned ship. Hiryu burned through the night before being scuttled. Yorktown, under tow and still stubbornly afloat, was finally lost on 7 June after being torpedoed by the submarine I-168, which also sank the destroyer Hammann. Even so, the strategic outcome was decided on 4 June when Japan’s carrier striking arm suffered irrecoverable losses.

Casualties and Material Losses

Japan lost four fleet carriers, around 250 aircraft, and many of its most experienced pilots and deck crews. The loss of veteran aviators was especially damaging. Training pipelines could build aeroplanes, but they could not quickly replace the combat-seasoned cadre developed over years of campaigning in China and the early Pacific War. The Americans lost Yorktown, Hammann, more than 150 aircraft, and many courageous aircrew, including most of the Devastator torpedo squadrons. Midway’s ground forces suffered heavy air losses as well. The numerical tally alone does not capture the effect on future operations. With its carrier core reduced, Japan could no longer take strategic initiative at will.

Why Midway Mattered

Midway stopped Japan’s expansion in the central Pacific and preserved the American carrier force as the nucleus for future offensives. It restored balance at sea far earlier than many planners had thought possible. Within months, the United States opened the Guadalcanal campaign, drawing the remaining Japanese carriers and surface units into a grinding attritional fight they could not sustain. Midway also buoyed Allied morale at a time when bad news still dominated in other theatres.

Command Decisions and Timing

The battle highlights how intelligence, doctrine, and small decisions interact in combat. U.S. codebreaking allowed Nimitz to choose the place and time. Spruance’s judgment on when to launch, despite incomplete contact reports and concerns about fuel and range, put dive bombers over the target window that mattered most. Nagumo’s doctrine bound him to finish the task against Midway while keeping a reserve. His rapid rearming orders, then reversal when enemy carriers were reported, created the conditions for disaster once American attacks arrived. None of these factors alone decides a battle. Together, and within minutes, they changed the war’s direction.

Myths and Realities

Midway’s story has gathered myths that deserve to be sorted. The sacrifice of the torpedo squadrons did not deliver hits, but it was not futile. Their attacks disrupted defences at the exact moment bombs needed to find decks crammed with fueled aircraft. The dive bomber’s success owed much to navigation, luck, and the tactical choice to follow that lone destroyer. It also owed much to the professionalism of aviators who had trained under pressure and learned harsh lessons at the Battle of the Coral Sea. On the Japanese side, the loss was not inevitable. Different timing in search patterns, a more efficient picket line of submarines, or a better-coordinated counterstrike might have produced a very different day. Midway is a reminder that war turns on probabilities, pressures, and timing as much as on raw numbers.

Technology and Tactics

Carrier warfare is a contest of scouting, deck cycle speed, and strike coordination. Radar provided the Americans with early warning and helped fighters intercept, although coordination between fighters and torpedo planes was still in development. The SBD Dauntless proved to be accurate and rugged, capable of diving steeply and pulling out under heavy load. The Japanese A6M Zero remained a formidable dogfighter, but it was optimised for agility rather than protection, and prolonged deck operations strained fuel and ammunition. Damage control differences mattered. American carriers emphasised compartmentalisation and firefighting drills. Japanese carriers, built for offensive punch, were more vulnerable to fires once bombs reached hangars filled with aircraft and gasoline.

Legacy at Midway Atoll

Midway Atoll today is a wildlife refuge and historic site. The runways and relics of the wartime base still tell the story of a small dot on the map that shaped events far beyond its lagoon. The battle is studied at naval academies around the world for lessons in intelligence work, decision-making under uncertainty, and joint operations across air and sea.

Final Word The Battle of Midway was not a duel settled in a single blow. It was a chain of choices, misreads, brave attacks, and a narrow window when one force was ready and the other was exposed. Codebreakers set the stage. Aircrew who had learned hard lessons brought the hits that mattered. Damage control teams kept ships alive long enough to strike back. In three days, and especially in five crucial minutes, the momentum of the Pacific War shifted. From Midway onward, the United States could shift from a reactive to an initiative-based approach, and Japan’s carrier arm would never regain its early dominance.

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